Mustafa Aksakal, The War that Made the Middle East. World War One and the End of the Ottoman Empire. Princeton University Press, 2026. £28.
Reviewed by Jeremy Black
This vigorous book is an engaged account of the end of the Ottoman Empire, one that attributes it squarely to participation in World War One. Aksakal, the Nesuhi Ertegün Chair of Modern Turkish Studies at Georgetown University, and author of The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War (Cambridge, 2008), has produced a snappy and well-written book, one that is commendably short compared to so many other works of scholarship, and a book that contributes to Princeton University Press’s deservedly high reputation.
I must confess to some reservations, and on the grounds of both tone and content. The former relate to Aksakal’s sense of certainty which leaves not only him but, presumably, the intended reader with the definite impression that there is scant room for debate. This is repeatedly the case with the matters discussed and with the interpretations placed on them. I prefer nuance to assertion and binary choices. As far as content is concerned, Aksakal repeatedly notes that there were differences, of opinion in particular moments, but then rides roughshod over them.
At any rate, most readers will probably agree that the war, and not the pre-war, wrecked the Ottoman Empire, and, indeed, its Russian and Austro-Hungarian counterparts, and with World War Two also causing similar chaos. Linked to this comes the sense that imperialism was stronger and grounded in more popular support than is often asserted by those focused on nationalism and national self-determinism. No surprises there, nor in the excellent discussion of the strains created by the war, notably in food provision communal relationships, constitutional governance and the rule of law. Aksakal is also interestingly suggestive on the role of the proto-nationalisms within the Ottoman Empire pushed to the fore by the war and its aftermath in the creation of the modern Middle East and its weaknesses. All to the good.
Possibly far less comfort should be drawn from his selection of material to assert a clarity of decision-making on the part of the other Great Powers, while maybe his somewhat benign account of pre-lapsarian Ottomanism (the ‘Fall’ coming in 1914–18) could do with looking at failures, attitudes and methods of rule over the previous 150 years and even refer to the idea that Ottoman conquest when it had occurred had been very violent and sometimes sociopathic in terms of the criteria employed by Aksakal. There is also the question of the frequent reconceptualization of the Ottoman Empire, with 1914–18 a stage toward a new empire, which reached its modern extent not only with the defeat of several crucial fissiparous tendencies in 1919–23 but also with the subsequent expansion, to include Alexandretta, Turkish Cyprus, a degree of control in northern Syria, and influence in the Caucasus, Libya and Sudan. At any rate, the very encouragement to debate of this stimulating book underlines the degree to which Aksakal richly deserves praise. A book to read and reflect on; and not least by those who work on other empires, including that of Britain.
