Mikael Weissmann and Niklas Nilsson, eds. Russia’s War in Ukraine and Modern Warfare. Strategy, Tactics, and Technology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2026. £30.00.
Reviewed by Jeremy Black
Few books live up to their push and puff, but this does so to a considerable degree. As the foreword by Mick Ryan points out, Ukraine provides useful insights into the future of war although at the same time only ‘a partial glimpse.’ The last is the key caveat because, of course, there is no one character to war, and never has been. Even when weapons are similar, their use is not necessarily so. Even when the use is similar, the goals vary. In short, war takes on much of its character from its context, notably the participants, from their purposes and from the contingencies that arise. These are not weapon-driven however much those who seek two-dimensional technological accounts might suggest otherwise. So, do not think ‘drones explain it all.’
Including the introduction and conclusion, this offers 19 chapters with thematic chapters followed by five case studies on sections of the conflict, four on 2022–24. The slow nature of modern publication means that there is a somewhat dated feel to the last section, but, actually, all the main themes are there apart, significantly, from an adequate coverage of the crucial political developments in Russia, Ukraine and internationally. To a degree, these are obscure, but that does not make them less important. In particular, there is all-too-little on the Chinese dimensions of the conflict. This is surely more significant than the Israel Defence Forces’ learning process from the war, which gets a chapter. So, no collection is perfect, and editors have to work with whom and what they can. The approach taken certainly provides a fascinating volume. If I am not particularly interested in Martin Bricknell on ‘Health Services in War’ or Tamara Martsenyuk on ‘Visibility of Women and Gender Equality Implementation in the Armed Forces of Ukraine,’ the others are much more up my street. Assessing manoeuvre warfare, Christopher Tuck suggests the need to devote more attention to its attritional counterpart. This poses a major challenge to short-war philosophies, doctrines and cultures, and notably America, as the 2026 Iran War is indicating. Weissman and Douglas Winton argue that the Ukraine war shows the continual salience of urban warfare and suggests that the widespread use of drones, electronic warfare, and sophisticated surveillance are supportive rather than game changing. Chase Metcalfe and John Nagl call for flexibility and adaptability in mission command, which may not seem surprising but comes at the close of an interesting chapter. Christopher Kinsey and Ronald Ti emphasis the significance of Russian military logistics and notably of its structural weaknesses. Deborah Sanders brings forward the maritime dimension, and argues that Ukraine’s strategy is unlikely to be readily replicated. Viktoriya Fedorchak underlines the significance of investment in people when considering the air war. Jack Watling looks at Ukrainian force-generation, possibly underplaying the crucial political context. Niklas Nilsson’s consideration of the intelligence systems includes consideration of the publication of material as a tool. Samuel Bendett discusses drones, AI and the continued reliance on infantry.
A major collection that richly deserves attention and that ‘underscores the centrality of the ability to adapt.’
