by Jeremy Black
The pace of change of the present is scarcely unprecedented, with 1945 and 1989 both seeing changes (and continuities) that were more transformative than those so far this year. Yet, the pace of the present is certainly unprecedented for today’s policymakers as is the apparent imminence of a very troubled future. The prime approach to geopolitics is that of a states system with states being the units that play the major roles and register success and/or failure. There is also a tendency to see states as playing off each other in action-reaction cycles. Furthermore, states are seen as the principal beneficiaries or losers. This approach as value and we will return to it, but it is also an approach that risks conflating countries, societies, and states – the language varies and conveys contrasting implications – with particular governments/regimes/leaders – again language conveying contrasting implications. The last is a fault of much standard geopolitical analysis, with its tendency to adopt a schematic approach and a systemic analysis, and one that regards states/societies/countries as in some fashion destined to a particular outcome by a ‘strategic geography’ or set of clear suppositions. This is an analysis, however, that downplays the role of circumstances, contingencies, individuals, and leadership, and the extent to which these interact and in a dynamic fashion.
Furthermore, their role appears more valid as the essential way to approach geopolitics in light of the abrupt and rapid changes in American policy in 2025. Abrupt and rapid changes are scarcely novel in geopolitics, but the element is to the fore in 2025 because they are seen with the leading power in the system. This should lead to a revision in standard geopolitical approaches.
Separate to this, but not necessarily unrelated, comes the argument that there are systemic ‘players’ but that they are different to states and indeed have an influence on the latter, sometimes possibly a conditioning influence. These ‘players’ were to the fore in Samuel Huntington’s prospectus of civilizational clashes, notably based on religion, an approach given great salience by the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent War on Terror.
In practice, such an analysis was far from new. This was true in particular of religious analyses and the related sense of existential challenge, but was not restricted to them. Thus, the idea of a Cold War rivalry between Communism and capitalism rested on such a civilizational clash. Moreover, it was one that spanned state rivalry, divisions within states, and international ideological tensions.
Classical state-based geopolitics was an alternative that served to qualify the ideological rivalry and alignments of the Cold War not least by looking at the breakdown at the practical level of what otherwise might appear as monolithic blocs. This appeared particularly relevant from the early 1970s when America allied with China.
Furthermore, such geopolitics seemed the best way to conceptualize international relations after the end of the Cold War. The End of History approach proclaimed the victory of an American-led Western capitalist model and left scant room for supra-national tensions as an element in international relations, let alone geopolitics. Yet, in turn, the transience of this End of History, with the revival from the 2000s not only of international religious antagonism but also of tensions between America and both China and Russia, suggested the need to re-conceptualize international relations.
Separately, there were other international circumstances and developments that invited discussions in part in terms of political contexts and consequences. These included environmental, demographic, and economic shifts of importance not only at the state level but also the supranational and internal ones. Some of these shifts were highly apparent, not least large-scale population moves. Indeed, in terms of the geopolitics of the present, it is these moves that are more immediate in their consequences for most people than anything else understood as geopolitics. As with international trade or indeed water or pollution (for example wind or water-borne pollutants), migration occurs as a spatial process – it is about movement – and has an impact on those who move, on those who stay, and on recipient communities who feel challenged, whether culturally or in resource terms.
This element interacts with the pressures created by population change, which is a fundamental driver of geopolitics. In particular, there are the differences between countries where the population is falling and those that are seeing rapid growth, a continuum from South Korea to Nigeria. Factored into this continuum comes the countries where the population is essentially static and those where growth is modest. These very different circumstances then help provide contrasting responses to rates of immigration and emigration. So also with the ‘culture’ of the society in question and, in particular, the degree to which there is an emphasis on a homogeneous people and, linked to that, an ethnic nationalism. These elements can be assessed, for example in terms of interracial marriage or of ‘mixed neighborhoods,’ with the ‘mixing’ referring to ethnic rather than social groups.
Immigration as a political issue has come more to the fore from the mid-2010s, notably with the Syrian refugee flow into Europe and also the greater politicization of immigration into America where very different accounts of national history were part of the debate. The rise of more right-wing parties or tendencies or leaders was a major consequence, and a key element in the geographical dimension of politics. Furthermore, there were abrupt consequences, as in the expulsion of illegal immigrants from America in 2025.
The extent of societal breakdown in a number of areas at present, including Gaza, Sudan, Niger, Mali, and much of Congo, as well as the rapid rate of population growth in many areas, particularly Nigeria, suggests that this aspect of geopolitics will become more acute in coming years, indeed very likely this year, and that that will interact with another acute area of geopolitical division: the tensions between international and national organizations, jurisdictions, laws, conventions, practices, and co-operations. Restrictions on migrant flow and reception represent a marked emphasis on the national over the international, and this is already a matter of acute tension within the European Union. The national unilateralism of the Trump administration is clearly attractive to many in this context, just as it repels others; and this underlines the extent to which geopolitics is as much about non-state elements as state ones, or, looked at differently, conflates the two and therefore leads to, as well as reflecting, divisions within states.
Where does that leave the more conventional routine of geopolitical discussion? Well, that clearly will have to be the subject of a number of contributions, but, before offering some preliminary observations, it is crucially important to note the contrast between geopolitics as analysis and geopolitics as rhetoric, both usually political but not invariably so. The rhetorical dimension is becoming far more consequential as populism continues to develop nativist themes, and notably so in America. Ironically, the Canadian election showed the same, with the Liberals finding populism in terms of a Canadian nationalism directed against the ‘immigration’ of Trumpian ideas. It is likely that the same trend will be seen in some other countries, notably in Europe, even if some politicians elsewhere seek to develop Trump-like echoes of a closer nature.
To turn to more conventional themes, the Ukraine war has shown the failure of deterrence as clear prior notice of Russian preparations touched off a major diplomatic effort that failed to deter Russia. Indeed, it is unclear how deterrence will be reintroduced, and notably so in terms of any settlement to that war that leaves Ukraine divided and the independent section vulnerable. This weakness of deterrence is also significant for the Taiwan issue, but, whatever such a question of how ‘the system’ is suspected to work, there is the clear warning from the renewed India-Pakistan tension of 2025, with the reaction to unexpected (or expected) events being focused by rival political systems on confrontation in a volatile international context. The same was shown in 2023 with the terrorist attack by Hamas and indeed those in 2001 by al-Qaeda. In this context, the key element in geopolitics becomes that of unpredictability, and any ‘systems’ should be understood in those terms. This suggests a dystopia that may indeed be the principal truth of geopolitics across history, with easy relations elusive and international organizations fragile. And these at the same time as highly volatile demographic, economic, ideological, and environmental problems.
Understandably there is a continual search for a familiar frame of reference. In part, this is due to the rhetorical contexts of policy, their essentially political components, and these can be presented as separate to those of analysis. That is not a helpful separation as the practice of analysis is scarcely different to the pursuit of politics however much there may be institutional contrasts. This point is certain apparent in the Court politics of present-day governing primates.
In the use of rhetoric, the normal frame of reference is that of the past, which is generally presented as history. It ought rather to be described as historical for the use of the term history implies a rational analysis whereas that of historical is more one that simply refers to the past. Thus, Appeasement continues to provide a leitmotif for debate, as with the presentation of Israeli policy toward Iran in 2025; others might suggest that in terms of ‘appeasing’ aggression, Iran and Israel are both, albeit very differently, involved.
From this perspective, it is notably that the relationship(s) of America, Russia, and China are frequently discussed in terms of a revived Cold War, a phenomenon that is then variously defined and dated, with discussion accordingly varying about causes, course, and possible consequences. The value of this comparison may be doubted, not least because the China of the 2020s is very different to that of the 1980s, let alone earlier. Furthermore, the contextual changes are not solely geopolitical, political, and economic, important as each is, and, even more so, in combination. In addition, there are contrasts between the ideologies at stake now and in the past. The rejectionism of Western norms that characterizes China and Russia today are very different to those seen in the era of the Soviet Union, even if an anti-(Western) imperial rhetoric can be seen in both periods.
The list can readily be extended, and these and other points are certainly instructive, for the present takes on, variously, explanation, understanding, and meaning in part by contrasts and comparisons. That is certainly the case if the complexity of the (earlier) Cold War is considered, a complexity that is not generally understood by many who employ the term to discuss the present. In particular, the ‘agency’ enjoyed by powers other than America, the Soviet Union and China takes on relevance. Indeed, China is included as a player in part because it was so conspicuous a departure from Soviet alignment. In practice, the autonomy of allies emerges clearly during the Cold War. This was an autonomy seen in particular in departing from the wishes of the leading power, as when Britain in 1964 refused American pressure to send troops to Vietnam or in 1982 to settle with Argentina over the Falklands. Romania followed a similar path for the Warsaw Pact.
There was also a willingness to take initiatives that might be unwelcome. This was the case repeatedly with France from the 1960s. There was also the independence displayed in particular conjunctures, as with West German Ostpolitik in the 1970s and (differently) 1980s. These instances can readily be repeated for other powers, as notably in the Middle East and South Asia.
All of these elements suggest a considerable fluidity to the Cold War, and this can be extended further if that is understood as beginning with the Russian Revolution rather than, as more commonly suggested, in the aftermath of World War Two.
Conversely, such an approach presents a way to incorporate the idea of a revived Cold War today, because one in 1918–41, followed by another in c.1945–91, with a major gap for some of World War Two, makes it possible to suggest another gap in the 1990s followed by renewed confrontation. For America-China, the relevant years would be 1949–c.80 and then c.2000–. This is not a case of the ready applicability of some quantitative model of international relations and a rhythmic system, but rather an assessment in terms of change.
Turning to Putin, Xi, and Trump, it is striking to see differences to the position during the conventional Cold War of 1945–91. Donald Trump echoes more the insularity and transactionalism of the nativist and even Know Nothing xenophobic rhetoric, than the internationalism of Cold War America. This is true in ideological, economic, and geopolitical terms, and notably so in terms of American policy toward Russia which is very different to that with the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is Trump rather than the West Germans who are pursuing Ostpolitik.
Russia under Putin seeks to dominate its neighbors, but this scarcely looks back to the Communist era, instead being reminiscent of earlier policies. It is no accident that Putin offers echoes to Peter the Great (r. 1689–1725) under whom Ukraine was subjugated in 1709 and the areas of modern Estonia and Latvia conquered. So also with Russian expansionism in the Caucasus. For China, there is scant anticipation to the navalism of the Xi regime; instead Mao Zedong conquered Tibet, sent troops into Korea, and had border clashes with India and the Soviet Union, while Deng fought Vietnam. When most powerful in the pre-Communist past, China has tended to expand into the Asian interior and not toward the Pacific.
For many reasons, the idea of a revived, continued, or second Cold War (all of these terms have been employed) is inaccurate. Might, however, the idea be helpful? It certainly can help governments and political parties in Eastern Europe keen to oppose Russia. However, the resonance of the Cold War for domestic politics is weaker in Western Europe and North America and even more so across much of what was earlier termed the Non Aligned World where America was frequently seen as the ally of colonial forces.
This lack of understanding of the global resonances of the Cold War is striking. Differently, there is the question of the repurposing of contested shibboleths within both Left and Right in the West. More particularly, struggles on both over goals and ideas incorporate foreign policy. Those that had divided Socialists from Communists during the Cold War now find a new content but with many former elements present. So also with tensions within the Right although these have become far more consequential, and in both Western Europe and America.
It is precisely this ‘unfixed’ character, both domestically and internationally that makes the present situation even more volatile and therefore important. Terms, analytical and rhetorical, historical and otherwise, should be employed with care. Yet, it is the very prominence of international relations that shows that the ‘intra-glacial’ period between ice ages of confrontation (whatever their cause and designation) is now at a close.
